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I. INTRODUCTION  
From 1992 to 1995, ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(“BiH”) waged the most lethal conflict in Europe since World War 
II.1 BiH was the most ethnically heterogeneous of the former 
 
 1. See Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 
Op. O.L.C. 327 (1995) (arguing that failure to intervene in the conflict in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (“BiH”) would result in the continued subjection of Bosnians to 
mass atrocities); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/2002/1314 (Dec. 2, 2002) (estimating that the war resulted in 200,000 deaths, 
20,000 missing persons, and 1.2 million internally displaced persons). But see The 
Conflicts, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/ 
sid/322 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (estimating the number of casualties from the 
war at closer to 100,000). 
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Yugoslavia’s six republics,2 and as Yugoslavia began to split along 
ethno-nationalist lines, with Croatia and Serbia each staking a claim 
to BiH territory, BiH erupted into war.3 The armed conflict between 
BiH’s three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) 
concluded with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Dayton Peace Agreement”) on 
December 4, 1995.4  
The Dayton Peace Agreement included a new Constitution for 
BiH.5 The drafters of this Constitution created a governmental 
structure based on power-sharing and political segregation of ethnic 
groups with the objective of avoiding future violent conflict and 
maintaining sustainable peace.6 The Constitution recognizes three 
“constituent peoples” of BiH: the Serb, Croat, and Bosniak (the term 
that refers to Bosnian Muslims) ethnic groups.7 It also creates two 
 
 2. Robert M. Hayden, Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-
Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia, 23 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 783, 
787 (1996) (describing BiH as the only former Yugoslav country that contained no 
clear majority ethnic group). 
 3. See VESNA PESIC, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SERBIAN NATIONALISM AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS 8 (1996) (noting that Serb nationalism and 
Croat separatism were two oppositional forces that drove the former Yugoslavia 
into violent conflict). See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, 
YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION (1996) (providing a comprehensive overview 
of the causes of the conflict in the Balkans). 
 4. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Rep. Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (bringing the war 
to an end and creating, with the assistance of the international community, the new 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 5. See id. Annex 4 (annexing a new Constitution for BiH to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement); see also James C. O’Brien, The Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTION MAKING 332, 337 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010) (remarking that 
international lawyers, and particularly those from the United States (US) and 
Europe, played a significant role in drafting the new Constitution). 
 6. See Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] 
[Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 
at 10 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/ 
povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 (citing the Dayton Peace Agreement and noting that 
BiH’s uniquely discriminatory state structure was created to preserve peace among 
the ethnic groups). 
 7. See USTAV BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE [USTAV BIH] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. 
(1995) (Bosn. & Herz.) [hereinafter BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION] (recognizing 
Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as “constituent peoples” and citizens of BIH, and 
recognizing all “Others” as merely citizens); see also The World Factbook: Bosnia 
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semi-autonomous territorial “entities” within BiH: the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Federation”) and the Republika 
Srpska (“RS”).8 The Constitution provides that election to the House 
of Peoples, the smaller of two parliamentary chambers,9 and the 
Presidency is dependent on both ethnic and territorial status.10 Today, 
the governmental structure created at Dayton amounts to 
constitutionally mandated discrimination that is no longer justified 
under the current conditions in BiH.11  
Bosnian citizens have challenged this discrimination as 
incompatible with BiH’s European human rights obligations at the 
BiH Constitutional Court.12 In 2006, the BiH Constitutional Court 
 
and Herzegovina, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html (last updated Dec. 17, 2012) 
(drawing a distinction between Bosniaks (or Bosnian Muslims, who comprise 
approximately 48.3% of the population of BiH), Croats (most of whom are Roman 
Catholics, at 15% of the population), Serbs (most of whom are Orthodox 
Christians, at 34% of the population), and other minority groups (2.3% of the 
population)). 
 8. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, arts. I, III (dividing BiH 
into two entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Federation”) 
and the Republika Srpska (“RS”)—each of which have their own set of 
responsibilities independent of the BiH state government); see also ANDY 
AITCHISON, MAKING THE TRANSITION: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, STATE-
BUILDING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 44, 46–
47 (2011) (remarking that by 1997, Serb-dominated RS was ethnically-
homogeneous, but the Federation was split between Bosniaks and Croats, with a 
clear Bosniak majority). 
 9. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, art. IV (providing that the 
House of Peoples has fifteen delegates, comprised of five Serbs elected from the 
RS, five Bosniaks elected from the Federation, and five Croats elected from the 
Federation). 
 10. See id. art. V (creating a tripartite Presidency, with one Serb elected from 
the RS, one Bosniak elected from the Federation, and one Croat elected from the 
Federation). 
 11. See, e.g., Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 33 (citing as evidence of dramatically improved 
peace and stability in BiH: the transformation of the ethnic armed forces into a 
small state military in 2005; accession to NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2006; 
the signing and ratification of an EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 
2008; constitutional reform regarding the status of the Brcko District in 2009; and 
election to the UN Security Council for a two-year period in 2010). 
 12. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, art. VI (granting the BiH 
Constitutional Court jurisdiction to determine whether any law in BiH is 
compatible with the Constitution and/or the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”)). 
  
2013] COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL DISCRIMINATION 673 
held in Appeal of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mr. 
Ilijaz Pilav (“Pilav”) that electoral discrimination under the 
Constitution is still justified due to current conditions in BiH and the 
ethnically divided nature of BiH’s internal order.13 Shortly thereafter, 
two Bosnians applied directly to the European Court of Human 
Rights (“European Court”) to challenge the discriminatory 
provisions.14 The European Court held that the provisions regarding 
election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency in the BiH 
Constitution are unjustifiably discriminatory.15 In January 2010, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a 
Resolution compelling BiH to implement the constitutional reforms 
requested in Sejdić and Finci prior to the October 2010 election.16 As 
of December 17, 2012, the decision has yet to be implemented.17 
 
 13. Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] [Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 at 9 (Bosn. & 
Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 
(stating that an electoral system must account for political, historical, and cultural 
context). 
 14. See Sejdić & Finci, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (deciding whether the BiH 
authorities’ decision to bar Dervo Sejdić, a Roma, and Jakob Finci, a Jew, from 
election to the BiH Presidency and House of Peoples on account of their respective 
ethnicities constituted discrimination under the European Convention); see also 
AZRA ŠEHIĆ ET AL., JUSTICE NETWORK IN BOSN. & HERZ., ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN 
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA: COLLECTION OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSES IN THE FIELD 
OF JUDICIARY 63–64 (2011) (explaining that Sejdić began petitioning the BiH 
authorities to allow him to run for office in 2003 and decided to sue BiH directly 
before the European Court rather than the BiH Constitutional Court after seeing the 
latter’s decision in Pilav). 
 15. See Sejdić & Finci, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33 (holding that positive 
developments in BiH over the past fifteen years have rendered constitutionally-
sanctioned electoral discrimination unjustifiable). 
 16. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1701 (2010): Functioning of Democratic 
Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶¶ 2–5 (Jan. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Eur. 
Parl. Ass., Res. 1701], available at http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/ 
XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=17800&Language=EN (expressing disappointment 
that all constitutional reform initiatives to date had failed, and urging BiH 
authorities to compromise on reforms prior to the October 2010 elections, lest the 
elections be held in contravention of the European Convention). 
 17. See Press Release, Delegation of the European Union to Bosn. & Herz., 
Statement on the Implementation of the Sejdić and Finci Ruling (Dec. 23, 2011), 
available at http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/News.aspx?newsid=30&lang=EN 
(articulating dismay that as of December 22, 2011, the BiH parliamentary 
committee tasked to Sejdić and Finci implementation had not yet introduced 
constitutional amendments in Parliament); see also Aida Cerkez, Bosnian 
Minorities Push for Right to Be Prez, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 31, 2012, available 
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This Comment compares electoral discrimination under BiH and 
European law by analyzing the Pilav and Sejdić and Finci cases. Part 
II(A) of this Comment discusses the relevant BiH constitutional 
provisions in more detail and the BiH Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence with regard to those provisions, particularly in Pilav.18 
Part II(B) describes anti-discrimination provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols (“European 
Convention”), to which BiH is a party, and the jurisprudence of the 
European Court with regard to those provisions; this section 
highlights the Sejdić and Finci case, in which the European Court 
ruled that the provisions of the BiH Constitution relating to election 
to the House of Peoples and the Presidency violate the European 
Convention.19  
Part III will examine why Pilav (in the BiH Constitutional Court) 
and Sejdić and Finci (in the European Court), two fundamentally 
similar cases, had such different outcomes in the two courts.20 
Specifically, Part III(A) will argue that the BiH Constitutional Court 
erred in its application of European Court discrimination 
jurisprudence, and could have found electoral discrimination in the 
Pilav case.21 Nevertheless, as Part III(B) will argue, the BiH 
Constitutional Court would have been justified in dismissing Pilav’s 
claim based on lack of jurisdiction.22 Part III(C) will argue that if the 
 
at http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2012/03/31/10953530-bosnian-minorities-
push-for-right-to-be-prez (reporting that the BiH Parliamentary Commission 
responsible for Sejdić and Finci implementation missed another deadline in March 
2012). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II(A) (explaining that electoral discrimination in 
the Constitution of BiH and the Election Law was originally justified due to 
interethnic tensions following the 1992–1995 war in BiH, which has subsequently 
been upheld by the BiH Constitutional Court in several cases, most recently in 
Pilav). 
 19. See discussion infra Part II(B) (explaining that Protocol 12 to the European 
Convention and the European Court’s interpretation of it in Sejdić and Finci have 
expanded the concept of non-discrimination under European law). 
 20. See discussion infra Part III (postulating that though the BiH Constitutional 
Court would have been justified in dismissing Pilav’s claim based on lack of 
jurisdiction, its reasoning with regard to the merits of the case was flawed, and the 
European Court would decide the case differently). 
 21. See discussion infra Part III(A) (arguing that the BiH Constitutional Court 
should have applied the European Court’s discrimination standard rather than its 
electoral rights standard). 
 22. See discussion infra Part III(B) (arguing that because the Constitutional 
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European Court took the Pilav case, it would decide in favor of 
Pilav.23 
Part IV recommends actions for the European Court, the Council 
of Europe, and the European Union to take toward eliminating 
electoral discrimination in BiH.24 First, it recommends that the 
European Court take the Pilav case, which is currently pending 
before the Court, and use it as an opportunity to clarify its 
jurisprudence with regard to the scope of Protocol 12.25 Second, it 
urges the Council of Europe and European Union to be more 
assertive in compelling BiH toward constitutional reform.26  
II. BACKGROUND  
A. ELECTION BASED ON ETHNICITY IN BIH 
The Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought the war in BiH to an 
unstable end in December 1995, created a new Constitution and state 
structure based on power-sharing mechanisms.27 The peculiar 
electoral system that resulted from this agreement is a reflection of 
the demands that had to be met during the peace negotiations before 
the warring ethnic groups—the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, known 
 
Court has held that it does not have the authority to judge the compliance of the 
BiH Constitution with the European Convention, it would have been justified in 
dismissing Pilav’s claim on this basis). 
 23. See discussion infra Part III(C) (explaining the similarities between the 
Sejdić and Finci and Aziz cases and the Pilav case, and noting that the European 
Court would find discrimination in the latter case based on its analysis in the 
former cases). 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV (recommending that the European Court take 
Pilav’s case and rule in his favor and that the European Community take concrete 
steps to compel implementation of Sejdić and Finci in BiH). 
 25. See discussion infra Part IV(A) (suggesting that the European Court should 
not wait for BiH to implement Sejdić and Finci before taking the Pilav case and 
recommending that the court rule that the issue in Pilav also constitutes 
discrimination under Protocol 12). 
 26. See discussion infra Part IV(B) (advocating that, as a member of the 
Council of Europe, BiH has an obligation to ensure that its Constitution conforms 
to the European Convention and should now be threatened with suspension after 
ten years of failing to do so). 
 27. See Anna Morawiec Mansfield, Note, Ethnic but Equal: The Quest for a 
New Democratic Order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 2052, 
2055 (2003) (remarking that the Dayton Peace Agreement may have ended the 
war, but it did not create peace). 
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as the “constituent peoples” of BiH28—were willing to end the armed 
conflict and attempt to share power under a unitary state 
government.29 As a result, electoral rights in BiH are tied to both 
ethnicity and citizenship within one of BiH’s two semi-autonomous 
entities.30 Bosnian citizens have challenged the relevant 
constitutional provisions as discriminatory, but the BiH 
Constitutional Court has declined to invalidate the provisions, both 
on the basis of lack of jurisdiction31 and on the basis that differential 
treatment in BiH is still reasonably justified.32  
1. Election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency  
Under the Constitution of BiH  
Election to both the House of Peoples and the Presidency in BiH is 
dependent on both ethnicity and entity citizenship.33 The House of 
 
 28. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7. 
 29. See Ronald C. Slye, Comment, The Dayton Peace Agreement: 
Constitutionalism and Ethnicity, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 459, 460 (1996) (stating that 
the “preservation of ethnic identity” has taken priority over preservation of peace 
and stability in post-war BiH); see also Paul C. Szasz, The Dayton Accord: The 
Balkan Peace Agreement, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 759, 762 (1997) (observing that 
the Serbs preferred a highly decentralized state with autonomous and ethnically-
homogenous entities, the Bosniaks and Croats desired a strong, unified, centralized 
state, and the resulting agreement aligned more with the international community’s 
objectives than those of any ethnic group). 
 30. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, arts. IV–V (providing 
that power in the House of Peoples and the Presidency is shared equally between 
Bosniaks and Croats elected from the Federation and Serbs elected from the RS, to 
the exclusion of Bosniaks and Croats from the RS, Serbs from the Federation, and 
all “Other” minorities). 
 31. See Tihić [Ustavni Sud BiH] [Constitutional Court of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina] Mar. 31, 2006, No. U-5/04 at 7 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=37994 (holding that the BiH 
Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether provisions of the 
BiH Constitution were compatible with the European Convention). 
 32. See Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] 
[Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 
at 10 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/ 
povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 (recognizing that differential treatment mandated by 
the State with regard to electoral rights is justified as necessary to preserve peace 
in BiH). 
 33. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, arts. IV–V (mandating 
that one Bosniak and one Croat from the Federation and one Serb from the RS 
compose the Presidency of BiH and that five Croats and five Bosniaks from the 
Federation and five Serbs from the RS comprise the House of Peoples). 
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Peoples is the smaller of two parliamentary chambers.34 It exists 
primarily to provide a veto power that each group of constituent 
people may invoke to strike down legislation deemed harmful to its 
interests.35 Article IV of the Constitution provides a strict ethnic and 
territorial breakdown for the House of Peoples, which is shared 
equally among Serbs from the RS, Bosniaks from the Federation, and 
Croats from the Federation, to the exclusion of Serbs from the 
Federation, Bosniaks and Croats from the RS, and ethnic 
minorities.36  
Article V of the Constitution provides for a tripartite Presidency, 
in which each member represents the majority ethnic group of the 
Entity from which he or she was elected.37 As with the House of 
Peoples, members of the Presidency may veto any executive 
decisions that threaten the interests of their respective ethnic 
groups.38 Serbs living in the Federation, Bosniaks and Croats living 
in the RS, and members of other ethnic minorities may not run for 
election to the Presidency.39 
 
 34. See id. art. IV (creating a bicameral legislature with a larger House of 
Representatives, where election is based on entity citizenship, and a smaller House 
of Peoples, where election is based both on ethnicity and entity citizenship). 
 35. See id. (providing that all decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly may be 
reversed by a majority vote of the members of one ethnic group in the House of 
Peoples). But see European Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the 
Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High 
Representative, Doc. No. CDL-AD (2005) 004, 9–10 (Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter 
Venice Commission Opinion], available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/ 
CDL-AD%282005%29004-e.pdf (finding that the vital interest veto creates 
political deadlock, and recommending the abolition of the House of Peoples 
because it serves no legitimate governmental purpose aside from guaranteeing that 
the special interests of the constituent peoples will be protected). 
 36. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, art. IV (stating that 
delegates to the House of Peoples shall be elected indirectly from the entities, with 
five Bosniaks and five Croats elected from the House of Peoples of the Federation, 
and five Serbs elected from the National Assembly of the RS). 
 37. See id. art. V (providing that members of the Presidency are elected directly 
from their respective entities: one Serb from the RS, one Bosniak from the 
Federation, and one Croat from the Federation). 
 38. See id. (providing that the Croat and Bosniak members of the Presidency 
must refer their veto decisions to their respective ethnic caucuses in the House of 
Peoples of the Federation for confirmation of the veto, and that the Serb member 
must refer veto decisions to the National Assembly of the RS for confirmation of 
the veto). 
 39. See id. (providing that only Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs have seats in the 
Presidency); see also Venice Commission Opinion, supra note 35, at 11 (observing 
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2. BiH’s European Human Rights Obligations 
The Constitution’s provisions regarding election to the House of 
Peoples and the Presidency conflict with BiH’s European human 
rights obligations.40 In 2002, BiH became a member of the Council 
of Europe, and ratified the European Convention and its Protocols.41 
The European Convention provides prohibitions against 
discrimination in both Article 1442 and Article 1 of Protocol 12,43 and 
guarantees electoral rights in Article 3 of Protocol 1.44 At the time of 
its accession to the Council of Europe, BiH also pledged to review, 
within one year, its electoral legislation in light of the European 
Convention standards, to revise its legislation where necessary, and 
to continually review the compatibility of all legislation with the 
European Convention.45 The Constitutional Court of BiH and the 
European Court differ in opinion as to whether the BiH Constitution 
is now in compliance with BiH’s European Convention obligations.46  
 
that, as with the House of Peoples, the purpose of the tripartite Presidency is the 
protection of constituent peoples’ interests). 
 40. See Venice Commission Opinion, supra note 35, at 5 (noting that many 
leaders in BiH are aware that the House of Peoples and Presidency provisions are 
discriminatory and in violation of the European Convention). 
 41. See Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 34 (noting that as part of its Council of Europe 
accession obligations, BiH is required to continually check the compatibility of its 
laws with the European Convention). 
 42. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter 
European Convention] (providing a prohibition against discrimination regarding 
the rights set forth in the European Convention and its Protocols). 
 43. See id. at Protocol No. 12, art. 1 (prohibiting discrimination with regard to 
any right set forth in any law). 
 44. See id. at Protocol No. 1, art. 3 (guaranteeing free and regular elections by 
secret ballot for legislative representatives). 
 45.  See Eur. Parl. Ass., Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Application for Membership 
of the Council of Europe, Doc. No. 9286, ¶ 15 (Nov. 20, 2011) (providing a list of 
Council of Europe standards and Conventions with which BiH was obligated to 
conform after accession to the Council of Europe). 
 46. Compare Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] 
[Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 
at 10–11 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/ 
povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 (holding that Articles IV and V of the BiH 
Constitution do not constitute electoral discrimination under the European 
Convention), with Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 
& 34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 38–39 (holding that Articles IV and V of the 
BiH Constitution violate Article 14, Article 3 of Protocol 1, and Article 1 of 
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3. The BiH Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence on Electoral 
Discrimination: Pilav 
The BiH Constitutional Court has limited jurisprudence on 
electoral discrimination under the Constitution, as it has only directly 
addressed the issue in one case: Pilav.47 In two cases prior to Pilav, 
the Court refused to decide the electoral discrimination claims on the 
merits based on procedural grounds.48 In 2004, Mr. Sulejman Tihić, 
the Chair of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, challenged 
the compatibility of Article IV (on election to the House of Peoples) 
and Article V (on election to the Presidency) of the Constitution with 
the non-discrimination provisions of the European Convention.49 
Tihić argued that these provisions unjustifiably discriminated against 
Serbs in the Federation, Bosniaks and Croats in RS, and all “Others” 
in prohibiting their election to these offices.50  
In 2006, the Constitutional Court dismissed Tihić’s case for lack 
of jurisdiction, noting that because the Court’s primary purpose is to 
uphold the Constitution, deciding whether the Constitution conforms 
to the European Convention is outside the scope of its jurisdiction.51 
 
Protocol 12 to the European Convention). 
 47. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 4–5 (deciding whether the constitutional 
provisions regarding election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency violated 
provisions prohibiting discrimination under the European Convention, 
guaranteeing electoral rights under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and guaranteeing equal protection before the law for minorities 
under the General Convention for Protection of National Minorities). 
 48. See Tihić [Ustavni Sud BiH] [Constitutional Court of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina] Mar. 31, 2006, No. U-5/04 at 1 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=37994 (holding that the 
Constitutional Court of BiH did not have jurisdiction in this case); Tihić (Tihić II) 
 [Ustavni Sud BiH] (Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina) May 26, 
2006, No. U-13/05 at 1 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/ 
odluke/povuci_pdf php?pid=43087 (rejecting the action for lack of jurisdiction in 
the Constitutional Court of BiH). 
 49. See Tihić, [Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] No. U-5/04 at 
1–2 (claiming that these constitutional provisions violate the right to be elected to 
the legislature guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention 
taken in conjunction with the Article 14 prohibition against discrimination). 
 50. See id. at 5–6 (requesting that the Court compel the Parliamentary 
Assembly to revise the contested articles of the Constitution and bring them in line 
with the European Convention). 
 51. See id. at 7 (explaining that granting itself additional powers, such as the 
power to determine the compatibility of the Constitution with the European 
Convention, is outside of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction). 
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In 2005, Mr. Tihić similarly challenged the compatibility of the 
Election Law, which is based on the provisions pertaining to 
elections in the Constitution, with the European Convention. The 
Court rejected the request on the same grounds as the previous 
case.52  
In 2006, the BiH Constitutional Court addressed an individual 
challenge to the presidential election provisions of the Constitution 
and the Election Law in Pilav.53 Mr. Pilav was a Bosniak citizen of 
the RS who ran for election to the Serb seat of the Presidency.54 In 
Pilav, the Constitutional Court upheld decisions by the Central 
Electoral Commission and the Court of BiH rejecting Mr. Pilav’s 
request.55  
Mr. Pilav argued that his inability to run for the Presidency on 
behalf of the RS violated Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the European 
Convention,56 and the Court rejected his claim.57 Relying on 
European Court precedent on electoral rights (under Article 3 of 
Protocol 1) rather than discrimination (under Article 14) in its 
 
 52. See Tihić II, No. U-13/05 at 5 (holding that because the provisions on 
election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency in the Election Law are 
derived directly from the Constitution, and the Constitutional Court is not 
competent to decide whether the Constitution is compatible with the European 
Convention, the Constitutional Court is not competent to decide whether the 
Election Law is compatible with the European Convention). 
 53. See Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] 
[Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 
(Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/ 
povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 (deciding the case on its merits, rather than dismissing 
it for lack of jurisdiction as the Court did in the Tihić cases). 
 54. See Matt Robinson & Daria Sito-Sucic, Two Decades from War, a New 
Fight to Save Bosnia, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 2012, available at http://uk.reuters.com 
/article/2012/04/04/uk-bosnia-war-idUKBRE8330GH20120404 (reporting that as a 
survivor of the Srebrenica massacre, in which Serb soldiers killed 8,000 Bosniak 
men and boys, Mr. Pilav is challenging the Constitution because it enshrines the 
ethnic cleansing of the war into law). 
 55. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 4 (noting that Mr. Pilav’s application for 
certification to run for election to the Presidency did not adhere to the requirements 
of Article V of the Constitution and Article 8.1 of the Election Law). 
 56. See id. at 8 (arguing that the rights and freedoms of the European 
Convention apply directly in BiH under Article II(2) of the Constitution and have 
priority over other laws, including the BiH Constitution). 
 57. See id. at 12 (holding that Mr. Pilav’s rights under the European 
Convention and its Protocols were not violated because there was a reasonable and 
objective justification for his differential treatment under the BiH Constitution). 
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reasoning, the Court held that Pilav’s inability to run for any of the 
three seats in the Presidency was reasonably justified.58 
B. NON-DISCRIMINATION AND ELECTORAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND EUROPEAN COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
The European Court of Human Rights analyzes electoral 
discrimination claims using three provisions of the European 
Convention and its Protocols: Article 14,59 Article 3 of Protocol 1,60 
and Article 1 of Protocol 12.61 Through its jurisprudence on 
discrimination generally and electoral discrimination specifically, the 
European Court has established tests to determine whether 
differential treatment qualifies as discrimination.62 In Sejdić and 
Finci, the Court both broadened the scope of the prohibition on 
discrimination under European law, and narrowed the scope of 
justifications that states may raise in defense of discrimination, 
particularly with regard to ethnic discrimination.63 
 
 
 58. See id. at 10–11 (arguing that differential treatment is still necessary to 
preserve peace and create conditions that could eventually foster a change in the 
constitutional structure of BiH). 
 59. See European Convention, supra note 42, art. 14 (providing a prohibition 
on discrimination to ensure the rights enumerated in the European Convention). 
 60. See id. at Protocol No. 1, art. 3 (providing for electoral rights with regard to 
the legislature). 
 61. See id. at Protocol No. 12, art. 1 (providing a general prohibition on 
discrimination under any law). 
 62. See, e.g., Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of 
Languages in Education in Belgium, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31, 34 (1968) 
(establishing that discrimination occurs where differential treatment has no 
“objective and reasonable justification”; this means that it does not pursue a 
“legitimate aim,” and the means used to pursue that aim are not proportionate to 
the aim). 
 63. See Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 35–36 (finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 
12 and holding that while analysis under this provision will follow the analysis 
used for Article 14, protection under this provision will not be restricted to the 
rights set forth in the European Convention as it is under Article 14); see also 
Lindsey E. Wakely, Note, From Constituent Peoples to Constituents: Europe 
Solidifies Fundamental Political Rights for Minority Groups in Sejdić v. Bosnia, 
36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 233, 247 (2010) (arguing that the European Court, 
as demonstrated in Sejdić and Finci, is requiring an increasingly narrow fit 
between the aim of discriminatory treatment and the means used to achieve that 
aim). 
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1. Non-Discrimination and Electoral Rights  
Under the European Convention  
The European Convention prohibits discrimination in Article 14, 
which guarantees equality in relation to the enjoyment of the 
substantive rights provided in the European Convention.64 The 
provision of the European Convention that addresses electoral rights 
is Article 3 of Protocol 1, which pertains only to elections to a 
legislature.65 The rights to both vote and stand for election are 
inherent in this provision.66 Prior to its decision in Sejdić and Finci, 
the European Court had only considered electoral discrimination 
cases brought under Article 3 of Protocol 1 in conjunction with 
Article 14.67 In an effort to broaden the scope of non-discrimination 
under the European Convention,68 Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the 
European Convention expands the prohibition on discrimination to 
cover any right guaranteed by any law.69  
 
 64. See European Convention, supra note 42, art. 14 (providing that the rights 
“set forth in this European Convention on Human Rights” are guaranteed without 
discrimination). 
 65. See id. at Protocol No. 1, art. 3 (providing for free and regularly-scheduled 
elections with confidential voting, which will guarantee “the free expression of the 
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”). 
 66. See Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 193, 206 (holding that 
though Article 3 of Protocol 1 only refers to the right to vote in free elections, the 
right to stand for election is implied in this provision as well; explaining further, 
however, that this right is not absolute, and states have broad discretionary power 
in deciding who may stand for election). 
 67. See Wakely, supra note 63, at 251–52 (describing the European Court’s 
Article 14 jurisprudence generally and noting that because Sejdić and Finci 
complained of electoral discrimination with regard to the Presidency, Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 did not apply, so Sejdić & Finci was the first case in which the 
European Court considered electoral discrimination under Protocol 12). 
 68. See generally Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 12 to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 2000, ETS No. 177, ¶¶ 20–21, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/ 
Reports/Html/177.htm (clarifying that Article 1 of Protocol 12 provides a general 
prohibition on discrimination with regard to any right, and is intended to provide 
broader protection than Article 14, which is limited to the rights set forth in the 
European Convention). 
 69. See European Convention, supra note 42, at Protocol No. 12, art. 1 
(providing that “any right set forth by law” is guaranteed without discrimination). 
But see EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS & EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
57, 63 (2011) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW] 
(explaining that though the prohibition on discrimination in Protocol 12 applies 
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2. European Court Jurisprudence on Non-Discrimination and 
Electoral Rights: Belgian Linguistics Case, Aziz v. Cyprus, and 
Sejdić and Finci 
The European Court has limited case law on discrimination due to 
the fact that Article 14 of the European Convention must be read in 
conjunction with other substantive provisions of that instrument and 
the court will not address a claim of discrimination where it is able to 
find a violation under another substantive provision.70 The cases 
below illustrate the Court’s jurisprudence on discrimination under 
Article 14 generally, and specifically with regard to electoral 
discrimination under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 and Article 1 of Protocol 12 in conjunction with Article 3 
of Protocol 1. 
The European Court conducted one of its first comprehensive 
analyses of Article 14 in the Case Relating to Certain Aspects of 
the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium 
(“Belgian Linguistics Case”).71 In this case, the Court held in part 
that Belgian authorities violated Article 14 with Article 2 of 
Protocol 1 (the right to education) by discriminating against 
French-speaking students living in the Dutch-speaking region of 
Belgium.72 In its analysis, the Court set forth a two-part test for 
Article 14 that it continues to apply today: discrimination occurs 
where (1) similarly situated individuals are treated differently and 
(2) that differential treatment has no “objective and reasonable 
justification,” which means that it does not pursue a “legitimate 
aim,” and “there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality 
 
more broadly to all national laws, relatively few states have ratified Protocol 12 as 
compared with the European Convention generally, with the result that different 
European states are now held to different standards vis-à-vis European non-
discrimination law). 
 70. See HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 69, 
at 60 (explaining that if the European Court finds a violation of a substantive right 
under the European Convention, it will not examine a discrimination claim based 
on the same set of facts). 
 71. See Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages 
in Education in Belgium, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1968) (explaining that 
because it had not yet provided a comprehensive analysis of Article 14, the Court 
was basing its reasoning on that of “legal practice” in democratic states). 
 72. See id. at 65–66 (claiming that French students received differential 
treatment with respect to entrance requirements and the degrees they could obtain). 
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between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.”73  
With regard to electoral discrimination, until Sejdić and Finci, the 
European Court had only considered cases under Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 in conjunction with Article 14 because the only electoral 
discrimination claims brought were those pertaining to election to a 
legislature.74 Of those cases, the Court only found an Article 14 
violation where the discrimination in question was a “fundamental 
aspect of the case,” as it did in Aziz v. Cyprus.75 Under Article 3 of 
Protocol 1, the Court gives a wide margin of deference to states in 
setting up their electoral systems, reasoning that states should be able 
to determine for themselves who is qualified to vote and run for 
office.76 Where electoral rights claims under Article 3 of Protocol 1 
are not brought in conjunction with discrimination claims under 
Article 14, the Court will give states an even wider margin of 
deference.77 
Where a claim under Article 3 of Protocol 1 is brought in 
conjunction with a discrimination claim under Article 14, the Court 
will typically address only the former claim.78 This is because the 
 
 73. See id. at 31 (noting that this test will also take into account the distinct 
features of each state in question and the freedom that national authorities have in 
choosing the means by which they conform to the standards set forth in the 
Convention). 
 74. See, e.g., Podkolzina v. Latvia, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 443, 449 (claiming a 
violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 with Article 14 concerning election to the 
Latvian Parliament). 
 75. See, e.g., Aziz v. Cyprus, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, 214 (finding a 
violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol 1 where the 
applicant was denied the ability to vote in any parliamentary election based on 
ethnicity and domicile). 
 76. See Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt v. Belgium, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 
(1987) (noting that electoral rights are not absolute because states are granted the 
discretion to make restrictions when setting up electoral systems). But see 
Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 193, 210 (warning that “[t]his 
margin of appreciation, however, goes hand in hand with European supervision”). 
 77. See, e.g., Ždanoka v. Latvia, 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 77–78 (holding that 
Latvia did not violate Article 3 of Protocol 1 where a candidate could not run for 
public office if he or she participated in Communist activities after January 1991); 
Gitonas & Others v. Greece, 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1217, 1236 (holding that 
Greece did not violate Article 3 of Protocol 1 with regard to electoral restrictions 
on the ability to run for Parliament if the candidate held public office in the 
previous three years). 
 78. See Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 26 
(declining to analyze the Article 14 claims because there was no violation of 
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Court uses a similar test for substantive electoral rights claims and 
discrimination claims, with one minor difference: under 
discrimination claims, a court must first determine whether similarly 
situated individuals receive differential treatment, then analyze 
whether the state has an objective and reasonable justification for the 
treatment (a legitimate aim and means proportionate to that aim).79 In 
contrast, under electoral rights claims, the Court first asks whether 
restrictions on the rights in question weaken the rights to the extent 
that they are no longer effective, before determining whether there 
was a legitimate aim for the restrictions and proportionality between 
the restrictions and the aim.80 Therefore, once the Court finds a 
violation of electoral rights, it is usually satisfied that the analysis 
need not proceed further.81 Conversely, if the Court does not find a 
violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1, it is unlikely to proceed to the 
Article 14 claim at all.82 
However, the Court affords special protection in cases where 
distinctions are based on race or ethnicity.83 In Aziz v. Cyprus, the 
Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of 
 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 based on the same set of facts). 
 79. See Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages 
in Education in Belgium, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1968) (adding that national 
authorities will be granted a margin of discretion with regard to the means pursued, 
because each society is different). 
 80. See Mathieu-Montin & Clerfayt, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 23–24 
(noting that the objective of this test is to determine whether citizens ultimately can 
still exercise their freedom to choose their representatives). 
 81. See Podkolzina v. Latvia, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 443, 460–61 (finding a 
violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 where a Russian-speaking candidate in Latvia 
could not run for office because she did not pass an examination testing her 
proficiency in the Latvian language). The Court found that though language 
proficiency is a legitimate aim, the language test was not carried out with the 
necessary procedural safeguards, and that this action violated the substantive 
requirements of Article 3 of Protocol 1. The court thus did not proceed to an 
Article 14 analysis. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Mathieu-Montin & Clerfayt, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 26 
(holding that there was no violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 where candidates 
elected to the Flemish Council had to take their oaths in Dutch because the policy 
pursued a legitimate aim, and analysis under Article 14 was unnecessary because it 
rested on the same arguments). 
 83. See D.H. & Others v. the Czech Republic, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, ¶ 176 
(2008) (noting that racial and ethnic classifications are particularly dangerous and 
require that authorities be especially sensitive to differences in treatment on this 
basis). 
  
686 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:2 
Protocol 1 where the Cypriot Constitution divided the legislature 
between Turks and Greeks, with different electoral rolls, after which 
the Turkish representatives then withdrew and set up their own 
government in northern Cyprus.84 The applicant in Aziz was a Turk 
living in Greek Cyprus who was denied the right to vote for 
representation in the legislature of Greek Cyprus.85  
The European Court in Aziz held that it will consider an Article 14 
claim in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol 1, rather than only 
focusing on the latter, if inequality in the enjoyment of a right is “a 
fundamental aspect of the case.”86 The Court noted that because the 
differential treatment based on Aziz’s ethnicity and domicile resulted 
in his absolute exclusion from legislative election and the state could 
provide no “reasonable and objective justification” for the treatment, 
the inequality in question was a fundamental aspect of the case, and 
there was a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of 
Protocol 1.87  
The European Court found electoral discrimination under 
Protocol 12 for the first time in Sejdić and Finci, striking down 
electoral discrimination in the BiH Constitution.88 In Sejdić and 
Finci, the Court declared that the same line of reasoning used in 
Article 14 discrimination jurisprudence would apply to Protocol 12 
discrimination cases as well.89 The Court focused on the 
 
 84. Aziz v. Cyprus, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, 209–14 (holding that electoral 
discrimination existed where election to the legislature was based on both ethnicity 
and residence within a given territory). 
 85. See id. at 214 (noting that, because of his ethnicity and his place of 
residence, the applicant was effectively denied all electoral rights). 
 86. See id. (observing that, in Aziz’s case, the discrimination claim was not 
identical to the electoral rights claim; it was a central and separate aspect of the 
case). 
 87. See id. (emphasizing that the circumstances of this case, combined with the 
State’s unwillingness to affirmatively provide equal treatment for Aziz, effectively 
meant that Aziz had no right to vote for representation). 
 88. See Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 38–39 (holding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 
12 where a Jew and a Roma were barred from election to the Presidency and the 
House of Peoples under the Constitution of BiH); see also Wakely, supra note 63, 
at 251–52 (noting that Sejdić and Finci was the first case where the European 
Court had considered an Article 1 of Protocol 12 claim). 
 89. See Sejdić & Finci, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35 (remarking that analysis for 
Article 14 and Protocol 12 will be the same because the meaning behind them is 
the same). 
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proportionality prong of its discrimination analysis to determine that 
BiH lacked an objective and reasonable justification for 
discrimination regarding election to the House of Peoples and the 
Presidency.90 The Court took into account several factors in 
concluding that the discriminatory measures under BiH law were no 
longer proportionate to a legitimate aim, which included: the positive 
developments toward peace in BiH since 1995; the ability to 
structure power-sharing in a way to include “Others”; BiH’s own 
goals for EU accession; and BiH’s experience with amending its 
Constitution in 2009.91 
Sejdić and Finci is significant for two reasons. First, it was the 
first time that the Court applied the general prohibition on 
discrimination under Protocol 12, and it made clear that analysis 
under this provision would be identical to that used for Article 14.92 
Second, it solidified the Court’s jurisprudence with regard to 
electoral discrimination based on ethnicity: where differential 
treatment is based on ethnicity, the Court will require a narrow fit 
between the “legitimate aim” proffered by the state and the means 
used to achieve that aim.93 Though the European Court decided 
Sejdić and Finci after the BiH Constitutional Court decided Pilav, it 
used the same line of reasoning that it had applied in previous 
electoral discrimination cases. The BiH Constitutional Court should 
have relied on this line of reasoning in Pilav.94 
III. ANALYSIS 
While the BiH Constitutional Court would have been justified in 
 
 90. See id. at 33 (posturing that it was unnecessary to decide whether 
discrimination under the BiH Constitution pursued a legitimate aim because, in any 
case, it fails the proportionality test). 
 91. See id. (holding that the exclusion of minorities from certain offices was 
justified at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, but could no longer be 
considered means proportionate to a legitimate aim based largely on these factors). 
 92. See id. at 35 (reasoning that because the meaning of the term 
“discrimination” in Article 1 of Protocol 12 was intended to be identical to that in 
Article 14, the analysis applied to these provisions must be identical as well). 
 93. See id. at 32 (stating that where discrimination is based on race or ethnicity, 
the justification for such discrimination will be interpreted strictly). 
 94. See id. (citing to the Belgian Linguistics Case for the discrimination test 
and D.H. & Others for the rule that justification for ethnic discrimination must be 
interpreted as strictly as possible). 
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ruling against Pilav based on lack of jurisdiction to strike down 
constitutional provisions, it nevertheless chose to decide the case on 
its merits.95 However, the BiH Constitutional Court erred by applying 
European Court jurisprudence on electoral rights and neglecting to 
consider its jurisprudence on ethnic discrimination.96 The 
Constitutional Court should have applied the standards set forth by 
the European Court in Aziz, which relied on discrimination 
jurisprudence.97 Were the European Court to take the Pilav case, it 
would rule in favor of Pilav, consistently with Sejdić and Finci and 
Aziz.  
A. THE BIH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REASONING IN 
PILAV BY APPLYING THE EUROPEAN COURT’S ELECTORAL RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE, RATHER THAN ITS DISCRIMINATION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Court in Pilav should have applied the European Court’s 
Article 1498 discrimination standard, rather than relying solely on its 
Article 3 of Protocol 199 electoral rights standard. The Court was 
justified in failing to undertake general discrimination analysis under 
Protocol 12,100 which Pilav pled, because the European Court had not 
yet decided Sejdić and Finci, so the Court had no precedent in this 
 
 95. See Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] 
[Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 
at 7 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/ 
povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 (noting that because the claims in Pilav’s appeal were 
not prima facie invalid, his appeal was admissible and would be decided on its 
merits). 
 96. See id. at 9 (observing that under European Court jurisprudence, the 
enjoyment of electoral rights is subject to limitations imposed at the discretion of 
the state). 
 97. See Aziz v. Cyprus, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, 214 (holding that the Court 
will assess electoral discrimination claims using its discrimination jurisprudence 
rather than its electoral rights jurisprudence where discrimination, especially that 
based on ethnicity or race, is a “fundamental aspect of the case”). 
 98. See European Convention, supra note 42, art. 14 (providing a prohibition 
on discrimination with regard to the rights set forth in the European Convention). 
 99. See id. at Protocol No. 1, art. 3 (guaranteeing electoral rights, which 
include the rights to vote and stand for office, with regard to election to the 
legislature). 
 100. See id. at Protocol No. 12, art. 1 (providing a general prohibition on 
discrimination with regard to any right under any law). 
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regard upon which to base its judgment.101 However, the BiH 
Constitutional Court chose to analyze only Pilav’s electoral rights 
claims, without also considering the discrimination claims.102 As Aziz 
confirmed, a Court should consider both the electoral rights claims 
and the discrimination claims (instead of only the former) where 
inequality of treatment is “a fundamental aspect of the case.”103 
1. The BiH Constitutional Court Erred in Relying on the European 
Court’s Electoral Rights Jurisprudence 
The BiH Constitutional Court was incorrect to apply the European 
Court’s electoral rights jurisprudence without giving appropriate 
consideration to Pilav’s discrimination claims.104 Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 to the European Convention does not apply to elections 
for executive offices.105 The Court in Pilav acknowledged that 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 applies only to elections to legislatures, but 
chose to apply it in this case anyway, in spite of the fact that Pilav’s 
claims pertained only to election to the Presidency.106 The Court also 
noted that the European Convention grants states considerable 
discretion in setting up their electoral systems.107  
The BiH Constitutional Court erred in citing as authority for its 
 
 101. See Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 35 (acknowledging that the Court had never 
analyzed a Protocol 12 claim before, and deciding to apply Article 14 analysis). 
 102. Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] [Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 at 10 (Bosn. & 
Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930. 
 103. See Aziz v. Cyprus, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, 214 (concluding that Aziz’s 
complete disqualification from voting based on his Turkish ethnicity as a resident 
of Greek Cyprus was a central aspect of the case). 
 104. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 10 (providing an extensive overview of the 
European Court’s electoral rights cases, but not citing to any discrimination cases). 
 105. See European Convention, supra note 42, at Protocol 1, art. 3 (referencing 
voting rights with regard to the legislature but no other political office). 
 106. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 10 (arguing that conclusions of the European 
Court made under Article 3 of Protocol 1 could similarly be applied to Pilav’s 
case, thereby granting the state a wide margin of discretion in restricting electoral 
rights). 
 107. Id. at 9 (citing Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt v. Belgium, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
(ser. A) at 23 (1987)) (stating that the European Court will uphold whatever 
restrictions states choose to apply to electoral rights, provided that the restrictions 
do not render the rights entirely ineffective, that they serve a legitimate purpose, 
and that they are not disproportionate to that purpose). 
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reasoning cases that were not analogous to Pilav’s case. As authority, 
the Court cited Gitonas and Others vs. Greece and Ždanoka vs. 
Latvia, neither of which involved any claims of discrimination.108 
The applicants in these cases only claimed violations of their 
substantive electoral rights under Article 3 of Protocol 1, without 
making any concurrent claims with regard to discrimination.109 These 
cases were therefore subject to an entirely different line of reasoning 
than Pilav, which was a case alleging both ethnic discrimination and 
violation of electoral rights under Article 1 of Protocol 12.110 The 
BiH Constitutional Court therefore erred in citing cases that involved 
only restrictions on electoral rights, rather than electoral 
discrimination.  
In addition to the error the Constitutional Court made in applying 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 without due consideration of Pilav’s 
discrimination claim, the Court did not even apply Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 consistently with the European Court’s jurisprudence. 
When deciding Article 3 of Protocol 1 claims, the European Court 
considers whether the restrictions imposed limit electoral rights to 
the extent that they are no longer effective; whether the restrictions 
are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and whether the means 
used are proportionate to that aim.111 The Constitutional Court erred 
on each of these three points.  
First, the Court did not examine whether the restrictions of the 
 
 108. See Ždanoka v. Latvia, 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (holding no violation of 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 because state authorities are better placed than the European 
Court to determine whether restrictions imposed on electoral rights are necessary 
under the circumstances); Gitonas & Others v. Greece, 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1217 
(holding no violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 because electoral rights are not 
absolute, the restrictions in question were prescribed by law, and that law was not 
disproportionate or arbitrary). 
 109. See Ždanoka, 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 58 (claiming a violation of Article 3 
of Protocol 1 where a candidate could not run for public office if he/she 
participated in Communist activities after January 1991); Gitonas, 1997-IV Eur. 
Ct. H.R. at 1232 (claiming a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 where candidates 
were barred from office if they had held public office in the previous three years). 
 110. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 4 (claiming discrimination under Article 1 of 
Protocol 12 by itself, rather than under Article 14 with Article 3 of Protocol 1 
because Article 3 of Protocol 1 only applies to legislatures). 
 111. See Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt v. Belgium, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 
23 (1987) (noting that the placement of restrictions on electoral rights is not per se 
a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1, and providing a test for determining whether 
such restrictions violate electoral rights). 
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Constitution and the Election law curtailed electoral rights to the 
point of depriving them of their effectiveness. Second, the Court 
cited preservation of peaceful conditions and the creation of an 
environment for dialogue that could lead to future constitutional 
reforms as the “legitimate aim” for imposing restrictions on the right 
to run for office.112 However, this “aim” is nebulous, as conditions in 
BiH have improved since the war ended in 1995113 and the divisive 
constitutional structure of the Dayton Peace Agreement is now 
impeding, rather than fostering, further progress.114 Third, the Court 
in Pilav did not engage in any meaningful analysis related to 
proportionality.115 Therefore, not only did the Constitutional Court 
use an inapplicable provision to justify its decision, it applied it in an 
incorrect and incomplete manner. 
2. The BiH Constitutional Court Should Have Applied the 
Discrimination Standard that the European Court Applied in Aziz 
The BiH Constitutional Court should have applied the analysis 
used for Article 3 of Protocol 1 taken in conjunction with Article 14, 
as it was applied in Aziz.116 Even before Sejdić and Finci, the 
 
 112. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 10–11 (arguing that the ethnic-based 
restrictions on electoral rights in BiH are proportional to the proffered aims). 
 113. See id. at 16 (Grewe, J., dissenting) (stating that conditions in BiH no 
longer justify continued electoral discrimination and that less restrictive means 
could be used to preserve the peace in BiH). 
 114. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Rep. of the Comm. on the Honouring of Obligations 
and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe: The Functioning of 
Democratic Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Doc. No.12816, ¶ 44 (Jan. 9, 
2012) (referring to the Dayton Constitution as a “straightjacket” that has been 
tightened by ethno-nationalist politicians, leading to obstructionism and political 
deadlock); see also EDIN HODZIC & NENAD STOJANOVIC, NEW/OLD 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING? 26 (2011) (referring to the BiH Constitutional 
Court’s logic as “paradoxical” for thinking that upholding discrimination will 
eventually eliminate discrimination in BiH); Robinson & Sito-Sucic, supra note 54 
(reporting that the Dayton state structure, which was originally intended to be 
phased out over time, is now deepening ethnic divisions and could lead to conflict 
in the future if BiH does not move forward with constitutional reform). 
 115. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 10 (stating vaguely, with regard to 
proportionality, that differential treatment is “justified at this moment since there is 
a reasonable justification for such treatment”). 
 116. See Aziz v. Cyprus, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, 214 (holding a violation of 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 taken with Article 14 where the Constitution of Cyprus 
divided the legislature between Turks and Greeks, with different electoral rolls; the 
Turkish representatives withdrew from the government and set up their own 
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European Court made it very clear that distinctions based on 
ethnicity and race will be scrutinized more thoroughly by the 
Court.117 Sejdić and Finci established that in cases of ethnic 
discrimination, the Court will give less deference to states, and will 
require a tighter fit between the aim of the discrimination and the 
means taken to achieve that aim.118 The case most similar to Pilav in 
this regard is Aziz, on which the Court should have relied by 
applying Article 3 of Protocol 1 with Article 14, rather than the 
former alone.119 
The Aziz case is similar to Pilav in that both cases involve 
applicants whose electoral rights were restricted based on both their 
ethnicity and domicile within a given territory.120 In Aziz, the 
applicant was a Cypriot Turk living in Greek Cyprus who, under the 
Cypriot Constitution, could not participate in legislative elections 
after the Turks withdrew from the legislature.121 The European Court 
in Aziz found a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1, together with 
Article 14, on the basis that there was no objective and reasonable 
justification for the differential treatment of Turks living in Greek 
Cyprus.122 Central to the Court’s conclusion were (1) the fact that the 
distinction was based on ethnicity; and (2) that the restriction 
 
government in northern Cyprus; and the applicant, a Turk living in Greek Cyprus, 
was denied the right to vote for representation based on his ethnicity). 
 117. See, e.g., D.H. & Others v. the Czech Republic, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 117 
(2008) (noting that discrimination based on ethnicity or race should be examined 
carefully because it is an especially offensive type of discrimination). 
 118. See Wakely, supra note 63, at 247 (citing Sejdić & Finci and observing that 
the European Court is gravitating toward strict treatment of the proportionality 
principle in cases of ethnic discrimination). 
 119. See Aziz, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 214 (finding a violation of Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 with Article 14 where the applicant was barred from voting in an 
election due to the combination of his ethnicity and his domicile in a given 
territory). 
 120. Compare id. at 209 (claiming electoral discrimination where the applicant 
was a Turk living in Greek Cyprus), with Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 3 (claiming 
electoral discrimination where the applicant was a Bosniak living in the Serb entity 
of BiH). 
 121. See Aziz, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 210 (citing the Cypriot government’s 
argument that Aziz’s inability to vote was not based on his ethnicity, but was 
purely circumstantial after the Turkish withdrawal to the north). 
 122. See id. at 212 (observing that the state could not point to the 
circumstances—where the Turks withdrew from the government and occupied 
northern Cyprus—as reasonable justification for withholding the right to vote from 
the Turks who remained in southern Cyprus). 
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effectively meant that the applicant could not vote in any legislative 
election, and the state therefore deprived Aziz of the very essence of 
his electoral rights under Article 3 of Protocol 1.123  
Similarly, Pilav, a Bosniak living in the RS, had no right to run for 
office at the national level because of the ethnic distinctions in the 
BiH Constitution.124 However, despite their similarities in fact and 
law, the BiH Constitutional Court in Pilav did not even consider Aziz 
as an authority for this case.125 Though Aziz involved the right to vote 
and Pilav involves the right to stand for office, the European Court 
holds that both of these rights are implicit in the electoral rights 
guaranteed by the European Convention.126 In these ways, the Pilav 
Court’s reasoning was flawed. 
B. THE BIH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED  
IN RULING AGAINST PILAV BASED ON LACK OF JURISDICTION  
AND ITS OWN PRECEDENT 
Even if the BiH Constitutional Court had found electoral 
discrimination under the European Convention in Pilav, it rightfully 
ruled against Pilav because it does not have the jurisdiction to 
overturn provisions of the Constitution. While the BiH Constitutional 
Court can interpret the compatibility of the laws of BiH and its 
entities with the Constitution and the European Convention, it cannot 
invalidate constitutional provisions.127 In the Tihić cases, where the 
Court was asked to determine compatibility of the Constitution and 
the Electoral Law with the European Convention, the Court held that 
 
 123. See id. at 214. 
 124. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 (citing BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 7, art. V) (acknowledging that the provisions regarding election to the 
Presidency are restrictive in character and exclude candidates based on ethnicity 
and entity citizenship, but arguing that they are necessary for strengthening and 
protecting the positions of the constituent peoples). 
 125. See id. at 9 (citing only to electoral rights cases, such as Gitonas and 
Ždanoka, rather than discrimination cases, such as Aziz). 
 126. See Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 193, 206 (holding that 
the right to stand for election is implied in Article 3 of Protocol 1, even though this 
provision only explicitly refers to the right to freely elect legislative 
representatives). 
 127. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, art. VI (granting the 
Constitutional Court jurisdiction over conflicts between the laws of BiH and the 
European Convention, but not jurisdiction over conflicts between the BiH 
Constitution and the European Convention). 
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it did not have the jurisdiction to decide on conflicts between the 
Constitution and European Convention.128 In doing so, it relied on 
Article VI of the BiH Constitution, which provides that the Court’s 
jurisdiction is limited to upholding the Constitution, as justification 
for declining to strike down provisions of the Constitution that 
conflict with international instruments.129  
Furthermore, although the Constitution provides in Article II that 
the European Convention shall apply directly in BiH,130 the Court 
held in the Tihić U-13/05 case that a caveat to this is that the 
Constitution is still superior to the European Convention in BiH.131 
The reasoning behind this is that the Constitution, by including a 
provision regarding direct application of the European Convention, 
grants BiH the rights and privileges provided in the European 
Convention; these rights thereby derive from the Constitution, rather 
than the European Convention.132 Because the Constitution is 
superior to the European Convention and the Constitutional Court 
must uphold the Constitution, the Constitutional Court lacks the 
jurisdiction to strike down provisions of the Constitution based on 
their incompatibility with the European Convention.133 Therefore, the 
 
 128. See Tihić [Ustavni Sud BiH] [Constitutional Court of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina] Mar. 31, 2006, No. U-5/04 at 8 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=37994 (dismissing the 
complaint because determining the compatibility of the Constitution with the 
European Convention is outside the Court’s jurisdiction); Tihić II, [Ustavni Sud 
BiH] (Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina) May 26, 2006, No. U-
13/05 at 5 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/ 
povuci_pdf php?pid=43087 (dismissing the complaint because the Election Law is 
based directly on the Constitution, and the Court does not have the jurisdiction to 
determine the compatibility of the Constitution with the European Convention). 
 129. See Tihić II, No. U-13/05 at 5 (explaining specifically that, “when 
interpreting its jurisdiction, [this Court] must always abide by the text of the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina”). 
 130. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, art. II (mandating that the 
European Convention have priority over BiH law). 
 131. See Tihić II, No. U-13/05 at 5 (holding that the Constitution takes 
precedence over the European Convention because the latter derives its 
applicability in BiH from the former). 
 132. See id. (stating that the European Convention only went into force in BiH 
by virtue of its inclusion in the Constitution, and that the latter thus necessarily 
overrules the former). 
 133. See id. (declining to determine the compatibility of the Election Law with 
the European Convention because the challenged provisions in the latter are 
derived directly from the Constitution, and the Constitution must be held superior 
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Court in Pilav could have dismissed the case based on lack of 
jurisdiction, as it did in the Tihić cases.134  
Based on precedent, the Constitutional Court also could have 
dismissed Pilav’s claims of discrimination under the European 
Convention by arguing that the BiH Constitution takes precedence 
over the European Convention.135 Instead, the Pilav case serves to 
illustrate the lack of consensus in judicial opinion on the status of 
international law in BiH.136 In Pilav, the applicants raised the 
arguments that the European Convention should be applied directly 
to the case and that the European Convention is on equal standing 
with the Constitution.137 However, the Pilav majority ignored this 
request and sidestepped the issue of constitutional superiority 
entirely.138  
Nevertheless, the separate opinions of individual judges show that 
the BiH Constitutional Court’s judges disagree about constitutional 
supremacy and the Constitutional Court’s role in this regard.139 Judge 
 
to the European Convention). 
 134. See Tihić [Ustavni Sud BiH] [Constitutional Court of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina] Mar. 31, 2006, No. U-5/04 at 1 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=37994; Tihić, No. U-13/05 at 
1. 
 135. See Tihić, No. U-13/05 at 5. 
 136. Compare id. (holding that because the BiH Constitution is superior to the 
European Convention, it was unnecessary to determine whether the provisions 
relating to election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency in the Constitution 
and Election law were compatible with the European Convention), with Stranka za 
Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] [Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
& Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 at 12 (Bosn. & Herz.), available 
at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 (deciding on the 
merits of the case that the provisions relating to election to the House of Peoples 
and the Presidency in the Constitution and Election law were compatible with the 
European Convention, based on European Court jurisprudence). 
 137. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 5 (arguing that the European Convention has 
applied directly to BiH since the state was created and is at least equal to the BiH 
Constitution, rather than deriving its powers from the Constitution). 
 138. See id. (summarizing the applicants’ argument with regard to the 
superiority of the European Convention, without directly analyzing it). 
 139. Compare id. at 17 (Grewe, J., dissenting) (stating that the European 
Convention and its Protocols are at least equal in authority to the BiH 
Constitution), with id. at 14 (Feldman, J., concurring) (noting that where the BiH 
Constitution conflicts with the European Convention, the Court must always 
uphold the Constitution, and cannot render a decision that would leave any part of 
the Constitution ineffective). 
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Feldman (an international judge), in the second of Pilav’s two 
separate opinions, concurs with the majority opinion on the basis of 
the BiH Constitution’s superiority vis-à-vis the European 
Convention, and the Constitutional Court’s duty to uphold the 
Constitution over European Convention.140 However, his opinion 
also hints that the European Court could strike down these 
provisions, given the Constitutional Court’s jurisdictional 
restrictions.141 Indeed, the European Court did precisely that in Sejdić 
and Finci.142 Moreover, that the majority in the Pilav opinion relied 
so heavily (albeit with error) on European Court jurisprudence 
regarding electoral rights implies, at the very least, that the BiH 
Constitutional Court views European case law as applicable 
precedent for human rights cases in BiH.143  
Given the Constitutional Court’s precedents with regard to the 
European Convention and the still-uncertain relationship between the 
Constitution and the European Convention in BiH, it would have 
been understandable for the Court in Pilav to rule that it does not 
have the jurisdiction to strike down constitutional provisions, even if 
they are discriminatory under the European Convention.144 
 
C. THE EUROPEAN COURT WOULD RULE IN FAVOR OF PILAV, IN 
LIGHT OF SEJDIĆ AND FINCI 
If the Pilav case was before the European Court, the court would 
 
 140. See id. at 14 (Feldman, J., concurring) (concurring that the Constitutional 
Court is required by law to uphold the Constitution as it is written). 
 141. See id. (Feldman, J., concurring) (“The European Court of Human Rights 
might perhaps decide that the constitutional arrangements for electing members of 
the Presidency violate rights under the European Convention (and nothing I write 
here should be taken to lend support to that suggestion under present 
conditions).”). 
 142. See Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 32–34 (striking down Articles IV and V of the 
BiH Constitution as incompatible with Article 14, Article 3 of Protocol 1, and 
Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the European Convention). 
 143. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 9 (citing several European Court cases on 
electoral rights as the basis for determining that BiH should be given a wide 
margin of deference with regard to its electoral system). 
 144. See id. at 12 (deciding the case on the merits, thereby avoiding the issues of 
the Court’s jurisdiction and the relationship between the Constitution and the 
European Convention). 
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rule in favor of Pilav on similar grounds as it ruled in Sejdić and 
Finci and Aziz.145 The only factual difference between the Sejdić and 
Finci and Pilav cases is that the Sejdić and Finci Petitioners were 
“Others” under the BiH Constitution, meaning that they were not 
members of the Serb, Croat, or Bosniak ethnic groups, and therefore 
had no right to run for Election to the House of Peoples or the 
Presidency.146 Pilav, on the other hand, is a Bosniak living in the RS, 
and though based on his ethnicity alone he is allowed to run for the 
Bosniak seat of the Presidency, he is barred from the Bosniak seat 
due to his RS citizenship.147  
It is this mix of ethnic and territorial requirements (rather than 
solely ethnic, as in Sejdić and Finci) that the European Court 
analyzed in Aziz, and would also apply in Pilav.148 In Aziz, the 
applicant was barred from voting for any legislative representation 
because he was a Turk living in the Greek area of Cyprus.149 
 
 145. See ŠEHIĆ ET AL., supra note 14, at 66 (arguing that Sejdić and Finci is 
applicable to Pilav, even though the former involved minorities (a Jew and a 
Roma) and the latter involved constituent peoples (a Bosniak)). 
 146. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, arts. IV–V (1995) 
(providing that only Serbs from RS and Bosniaks and Croats from the Federation 
may be elected to the House of Peoples and the Presidency); see also Sejdić & 
Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 1 (noting that as a Roma and Jew, respectively, Sejdić and Finci were barred 
from election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency). 
 147. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 3 (noting that though Pilav is a Bosniak and 
the Presidency has a seat reserved for Bosniaks, Pilav’s RS citizenship meant that 
his only option to run for this office was to contest the Serb seat of the Presidency, 
which the Central Election Commission barred him from doing based on the 
Constitution and the Election Law). 
 148. Compare Sejdić & Finci, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33–34 (finding that 
preventing people classified as “Other” from standing for election breached Article 
14 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol 1), with Aziz v. Cyprus, 2004-V 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, 214 (noting that it was a combination of the applicant’s Turkish 
ethnicity and territorial placement in Greek Cyprus that precluded him from voting 
by law, which the Court used as the basis for finding that the applicant was 
deprived of the very essence of his electoral rights under Article 3 of Protocol 1), 
and Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 17 (Grewe, J., dissenting) (remarking that as a 
Bosniak, Pilav was guaranteed equality in BiH, but it was the combination of 
ethnic and territorial requirements that precluded him from election to the 
Presidency as a Bosniak citizen of RS) (emphasis added). 
 149. See Aziz, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 212 (observing that Aziz’s inability to 
vote for representation stemmed from constitutional provisions that became 
ineffective after the Turks withdrew from the Cypriot government, and that no 
legislative solutions were subsequently adopted). 
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Likewise, in Pilav, the applicant is barred from running for election 
to the House of Peoples and the Presidency because he is a Bosniak 
living in the Serb area of BiH.150 Given the factual similarities 
between Pilav, Sejdić and Finci, and Aziz, the European Court would 
likely apply the discrimination test applied that it applied in Sejdić 
and Finci and Aziz, rather than the electoral rights analysis that the 
BiH Constitutional Court relied on in Pilav.151 
If the European Court took the Pilav case, it would likely take the 
case as an opportunity to reiterate that ethnic discrimination in 
Europe is not tolerated. Aziz and Sejdić and Finci show that the 
European Court’s discrimination jurisprudence is evolving; it is 
taking an increasingly narrow view of what constitutes a reasonable 
justification for differential treatment, particularly as it relates to 
ethnic discrimination.152 Because differential treatment in BiH’s 
Constitution and state structure was necessary for the preservation of 
peace at the time of creation and peace in BiH has been unstable 
since 1995 due to political tensions between ethnic groups, BiH 
could argue that there is reasonable justification for the differential 
treatment in Pilav.153  
 
 150. See Pilav, No. AP-2678/06 at 4 (citing BOSN. & HERZ. CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 7, art. V) (providing that Bosniaks can only be elected to the Presidency 
if they are residents of the Federation). 
 151. See Aziz, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 214 (engaging in discrimination analysis 
because inequality of treatment was a fundamental aspect of the case, and finding 
no reasonable or objective justification for the discrimination); see also Sejdić & 
Finci, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32 (noting that the reasonable and objective 
justification analysis must be interpreted strictly where distinctions are based on 
ethnicity, and holding that BiH failed the proportionality prong of that test because 
the means employed were not proportionate to the proffered aim). But see Pilav, 
No. AP-2678/06 at 9 (focusing on the European Court’s electoral rights 
jurisprudence to find that BiH should have a wide margin of discretion with regard 
to its electoral system, and providing only cursory analysis of the discrimination 
claims). 
 152. See Wakely, supra note 63, at 254 (noting that Sejdić and Finci advanced 
case law in favor of minorities, and that the European Court is now likely to limit 
the circumstances under which it will allow for discrimination, even where a 
reasonable and objective justification is present). 
 153. See VLADO AZINOVIC ET AL., ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR RENEWED 
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS 15 
(2011) (noting that the use of hate speech, references to the war, and threats of 
secession are common political tools in BiH, which have been on the rise since 
2006); see also Republika Srpska's Dodik Says He’s ‘Only Supporting the 
Constitution,’ RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 14, 2011), 
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However, the Court held in Sejdić and Finci that in democratic 
states, even severe ethnic tensions cannot justify prohibiting an 
otherwise qualified applicant from contesting seats in the legislature 
and presidency.154 Therefore, given its decisions in Aziz and Sejdić 
and Finci, the European Court would likely apply its discrimination 
test—looking at whether differential treatment has an objective and 
reasonable justification, which means that it pursues a legitimate 
aim, and the means employed are proportionate to the aim pursued—
and hold that Pilav’s inability to run for the House of Peoples and 
Presidency is unjustifiable discrimination.155  
Moreover, with regard to the jurisdictional questions surrounding 
the Tihić cases and Pilav, the European Court in Sejdić and Finci 
interpreted Article II of the BiH Constitution to mean that the 
European Convention takes precedence over Bosnian law.156 As 
justification for this conclusion, it observed that the international 
lawyers who drafted the BiH Constitution acknowledged that several 
provisions conflicted with international human rights instruments 
and included Article II, which provides that the European 
Convention applies directly in BiH, to support their eventual phasing 
out.157 Additionally, the European Court hinted that the BiH 
Constitutional Court no longer assumes that the Constitution takes 
precedence over the European Convention.158  
 
http://www.rferl.org/content/interview_milorad_dodik_bosnia_republika_srpska_ 
politics/24360012.html (interviewing RS President Milorad Dodik, who claims 
that the current political crisis is to be expected of a state whose Constitution is 
ethnically-focused and which is essentially a failed political experiment of the 
international community). 
 154. See Sejdić & Finci, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33 (acknowledging that ethnic 
tension is still a problem in BiH but focusing on the positive developments toward 
peace since 1995). 
 155. See Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages 
in Education in Belgium, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1968) (holding that 
differential treatment does not per se constitute discrimination, provided it is 
reasonably and objectively justified). 
 156. See Sejdić & Finci, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 9 (citing BOSN. & HERZ. 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, art. II) (providing that the European Convention 
applies directly in BiH and has priority over all other laws therein). 
 157. See id. at 8 (observing that Article II was included in the BiH Constitution 
under the assumption that the Constitution would evolve over time but that the 
European Convention would always take priority). 
 158. See id. at 9 (citing the decision of the BiH Constitutional Court in Pilav to 
consider the case on its merits, rather than dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction 
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Therefore, the European Court in Pilav would similarly conclude 
that the European Convention takes precedence over the BiH 
Constitution. Moreover, assuming that constitutional reforms were 
not undertaken to remove the type of discrimination present in the 
Pilav case, the European Court would almost certainly rule in Pilav’s 
favor. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Constitution of BiH is discriminatory with regard to electoral 
rights, and the BiH Constitutional Court is both unwilling and unable 
to overturn Articles IV and V, which provide for this 
discrimination.159 Therefore, if BiH is to continue as a member of the 
Council of Europe, the European Court and the Council of Europe 
should address discrimination in BiH to the extent they are able. The 
European Court should take the Pilav case and rule in favor of Pilav, 
if not to send BiH another message that ethnic discrimination is not 
tolerated in European states, then to clarify its jurisprudence with 
regard to Protocol 12. The Council of Europe should take more 
assertive steps to compel BiH to implement the Sejdić and Finci 
decision, thereby preempting the need for a decision in Pilav.  
A. THE EUROPEAN COURT SHOULD TAKE THE PILAV CASE AS AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY ITS PROTOCOL 12 JURISPRUDENCE 
The Pilav case is currently pending before the European Court.160 
However, the European Court is unlikely to take the Pilav case in the 
near future as, in 2010, the Court implemented amended versions of 
its Rules to reflect a new “priority policy,” whereby it will prioritize 
 
as it did in the Tihić cases). 
 159. See Tihić [Ustavni Sud BiH] [Constitutional Court of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina] Mar. 31, 2006, No. U-5/04 at 8 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=37994 (dismissing the 
complaint because invalidating provisions of the Constitution is outside the Court’s 
jurisdiction); see also Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] 
[Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 
at 12 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/ 
povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 (holding that discrimination in the Constitution is 
reasonably justified). 
 160. See HODZIC & STOJANOVIC, supra note 114, at 26 (noting, somewhat 
optimistically, that it “remains to be seen” how the European Court will treat the 
Pilav case). 
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the cases it deems the most urgent, important, and relevant to 
widespread problems.161 Cases deemed “repetitive” are near the 
bottom of the list of priority categories.162 Given the similarities 
between the issues decided in Sejdić and Finci and those raised in 
Pilav, the Pilav case would likely be considered “repetitive,” and 
thus low on the Court’s priority list.163 Additionally, the Court 
currently has a backlog of around 150,000 cases, and the authority of 
the European Court to overrule the decisions and actions of national 
courts and governments is a topic of debate.164 
Nevertheless, the European Court should take the Pilav case, if not 
to further compel BiH toward constitutional reform, then to clarify 
its jurisprudence with regard to discrimination under Article 1 of 
Protocol 12. In light of Sejdić and Finci, the Court’s jurisprudence 
on Protocol 12 remains unclear.165 A simple analysis of the Sejdić 
and Finci decision could lead to the conclusion that the Court in that 
case applied Protocol 12 only because election for President is not 
guaranteed in the European Convention, thereby barring the Court 
 
 161. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE COURT’S PRIORITY POLICY, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DB6EDF5E-6661-4EF6-992E-
F8C4ACC62F31/0/Priority_policyPublic_communication_EN.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012) (detailing the new priority policy, which creates seven categories for 
cases, where high priority cases are those that pertain to threats to life and health, 
and low priority cases are those that are repetitive of earlier decisions or are 
inadmissible). 
 162. See id. (noting that repetitive cases are those where the Court has already 
issued a leading judgment on a similar structural problem). 
 163. See generally Antoine Buyse, The Court’s New Priority Policy, EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS BLOG (Nov. 17, 
2010, 9:53 AM), http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/courts-new-priority-
policy.html?m=1 (commenting that the European Court’s new priority policy will 
decrease the Court’s case output, with the result that cases of lower priority could 
remain on the Court’s docket indefinitely). 
 164. See Nicholas Watt & Owen Bowcott, David Cameron Calls for Reform of 
European Court of Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jan/25/david-cameron-reform-human-rights 
(explaining that United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron is leading reform 
efforts that would make the European Court “subsidiary” to national authorities, 
and noting that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has 
expressed its consent to the proposals, as part of a greater effort to clear the 
backlog of cases at the Court). 
 165. See Wakely, supra note 63, at 252 (commenting that while Article 14 
application is restricted to the rights set forth in the European Convention, no 
similar restriction is placed on Protocol 12, which, after Sejdić and Finci, can 
seemingly apply to any right under any law). 
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from applying Article 14.166 Observing states could therefore infer 
that in the future, the Court will apply Protocol 12 in any case where 
Article 14 would otherwise restrain it.167 
To date, only six out of 27 European Union Member States and 17 
out of 47 Council of Europe Member States have signed Protocol 
12.168 This reflects states’ concerns that Protocol 12 could sweep too 
broadly169 because the Court could apply it to “any right set forth by 
law.”170  
The European Court should therefore take the Pilav case and 
clarify when and how the Court will apply Protocol 12 and what kind 
of judicial restraints will be placed on the use of the provision. 
B. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND EUROPEAN UNION  
SHOULD TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD COMPELLING 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SEJDIĆ AND FINCI IN BIH 
European officials are applying a “wait and see” policy to BiH 
with regard to implementation of the Sejdić and Finci case.171 
 
 166. See Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 44 (Mijovic, J., partly dissenting and partly 
concurring) (expressing concern that the Court created no universal standards or 
tests with regard to Protocol 12 specifically and that the Court’s reliance on Article 
14 jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that Protocol 12 will be used anywhere 
that Article 14 cannot be applied). 
 167. See id. (remarking that the Court’s failure to engage in any meaningful 
analysis with regard to Protocol 12 beyond that applied for Article 14 leaves it 
unclear how the Court will apply this provision in the future). 
 168. See HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 69, 
at 57 (observing that this effectively creates a legal patchwork across Europe with 
regard to non-discrimination law, whereby different states have different 
obligations). 
 169. See Sandra Fredman, Why the UK Government Should Sign and Ratify 
Protocol 12, EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES REV. 21, 21 (May 2002) (noting that the UK 
has three primary arguments for not ratifying Protocol 12: (1) it is unclear whether 
“rights set forth by law” applies solely to national law, or to international law as 
well; (2) it does not explicitly allow states to offer objective and reasonable 
justifications for differential treatment; and (3) it does not explicitly allow for 
positive measures that require differential treatment to rectify past discrimination). 
 170. European Convention, supra note 42, at Protocol 12, art. 1. 
 171. See Celine Tran, Striking a Balance Between Human Rights and Peace and 
Stability: A Review of the European Court of Human Rights Decision Sejdić and 
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. L. HUM. RTS. BRIEF 
3, 7 (2011) (observing that the Council of Europe has taken no coercive measures 
with regard to BiH’s implementation of Sejdić and Finci, and that it remains to be 
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However, both the European Court’s Protocol 12 jurisprudence and 
the European anti-discrimination standards generally are at risk of 
being delegitimized by the European community’s failure to compel 
BiH to implement Sejdić and Finci. The Council of Europe (“CoE”) 
and European Union (“EU”) should therefore be more forceful with 
regard to implementation of Sejdić and Finci in BiH.172  
Since the Sejdić and Finci decision in 2009, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (“PACE”) has passed several 
resolutions expressing its disappointment over BiH’s inability to 
implement the decision.173 However, more forceful action is 
necessary for BiH to take its ties to the European community and 
requirements for EU accession seriously. 
The CoE has an obligation to compel action in BiH. BiH joined 
the CoE as a member state in 2002, ratified the European 
Convention and its Protocols without reservations, and agreed to 
review its electoral laws and bring them in line with CoE 
Standards within one year.174 As a member of the CoE, therefore, 
BiH has had ten years to implement the changes that were 
 
seen what measures it might take if BiH continues to miss deadlines). 
 172. See Amanda McCrae, Protecting Minorities in Bosnia - the EU Has a Role 
to Play, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2012/04/20/protecting-minorities-bosnia-eu-has-role-play (noting that though the 
EU has conditioned BiH’s potential membership on implementation of Sejdić and 
Finci, it has provided BiH with minimal guidance as to what constitutional reforms 
the EU would accept to allow membership talks to move forward); see also Valerie 
Hopkins, Deadline Looms for Bosnia to Reform Constitution, BALKANINSIGHT 
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/deadline-looms-for-
bosnia-to-reform-constitution (noting that the EU and the Council of Europe have 
accepted minimal changes as evidence of progress in BiH). 
 173. See, e.g., Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1701, supra note 16, ¶ 5 (expressing concern 
that BiH has not taken appropriate steps toward revising its Constitution); Eur. 
Parl. Ass., Res. 1725 (2010): Urgent Need for Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, ¶ 2 (Apr. 29, 2010) (stating that “[t]he Assembly is seriously 
concerned that the initiatives launched by the authorities so far have not led to any 
concrete results”); Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1855 (2012): The Functioning of 
Democratic Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶ 5 (Jan. 24, 2012) 
[hereinafter Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1855 (2012)] (emphasizing, “[t]he Assembly 
reiterates that the Sejdić and Finci judgment is legally binding and must be 
implemented”). 
 174. Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 34 (citing Eur. Parl. Ass., Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe, Doc. No. 
9286 (Nov. 20, 2011)). 
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required as conditions of its membership.175  
The Statute of the CoE provides that any member that is unwilling 
to fulfill its obligations vis-à-vis the guarantee of fundamental rights 
and freedoms of its citizens may be asked to withdraw from the 
CoE.176 PACE has suspended states in the past, including Belarus, 
which was given CoE “special guest” status in 1992.177 In 1997, due 
to its lack of progress in the fields of democratization and human 
rights, this status was revoked.178 Furthermore, in 2012, PACE issued 
a resolution calling on its members to impose economic sanctions 
against Belarus, in response to the deteriorating human rights 
situation there.179 A similar approach of phased threats and actions 
could be used with BiH. 
In a January 2012 resolution on BiH, PACE stated that progress 
had to be made on implementing Sejdić and Finci by March 15, 
2012, or it would consider “further action” against BiH.180 BiH failed 
to meet this deadline.181 Therefore, PACE should threaten to suspend 
 
 175. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Report on the Urgent Need for a Constitutional Reform 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Doc. No. 12222, ¶¶ 8–9 (Apr. 27, 2010) (recalling 
BiH’s obligation to review its electoral system within a year of accession and 
expressing dismay at the several failed attempts at constitutional reform since 
2002). 
 176. See Statute of the Council of Europe art. 8, May 5, 1949, C.E.T.S. 001 
(providing that any member that violates Article 3 of the statute will lose its right 
to representation in the CoE). 
 177. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1671(2009): Situation in Belarus, ¶ 1 (June 23, 
2009) (providing an overview of the relationship between Belarus and the Council 
of Europe from 1992 to 2009). 
 178. See id. (noting that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(“PACE”) was closely following the situation in Belarus as part of the 
determination of whether or not to accept Belarus’s application for membership, 
which it froze following the suspension of Belarus’s “special guest” status). 
 179. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1857 (2012): Situation in Belarus, ¶ 12 (Jan. 25, 
2012) (expressing concern over the imprisonment of political dissenters following 
2011 elections, and calling on CoE member states to join the sanctions regime of 
the EU against Belarus). 
 180. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1855 (2012), supra note 173, ¶ 15 (remarking that 
Sejdić and Finci implementation is of particular importance now; 2012 marked 
BiH’s ten year anniversary as a member of the CoE). 
 181. See Elvira Jukic, Bosnians Fail to Agree to Sejdić-Finci Changes, 
BALKANINSIGHT (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ 
bosnian-leaders-fail-agreement-on-human-rights-ruling (reporting that the mandate 
of the BiH parliamentary commission charged with Sejdić and Finci 
implementation expired on March 12, 2012, without an agreement among the 
relevant parties as to implementation). 
  
2013] COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL DISCRIMINATION 705 
BiH’s membership; at the very least, more concrete threats on the 
part of PACE will force BiH to reexamine its relationship with the 
European community and formulate a shared vision for its future 
with the CoE and the EU.182 
Concurrently, the EU should continue to push BiH to make 
comprehensive, meaningful changes to its Constitution as part of the 
EU accession process. BiH is a potential candidate for EU 
membership, and signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
with the EU in 2008.183 However, the EU has made clear that 
implementation of the Sejdić and Finci case is a precondition for EU 
membership.184 The EU should leverage BiH’s desire to join the EU 
to compel BiH toward comprehensive constitutional reform that 
would both implement Sejdić and Finci by removing ethnic 
roadblocks to political participation and create a more modern 
constitutional structure for BiH.185 
V. CONCLUSION  
Though constitutionally mandated electoral discrimination in BiH 
was justified in the immediate aftermath of the 1992-1995 war, it is 
no longer justified under current conditions in BiH. The European 
Court of Human Rights has developed extensive jurisprudence under 
Article 14 of the European Convention, which justifies 
discrimination under some circumstances, but it sent a clear message 
 
 182. See generally Hopkins, supra note 172 (quoting Mary Ann Hennessey, the 
head of the CoE’s Sarajevo Office, as noting that the combination of BiH’s failure 
to implement Sejdić and Finci and its looming ten year anniversary in the CoE is 
raising questions as to whether BiH even wants to remain a member of the CoE). 
 183. Key Dates: Milestones on BiH’s Road to Europe, DELEGATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION TO BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/ 
Default.aspx?id=12&lang=EN (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
 184. See Štefan Füle, Eur. Comm’r for Enlargement and Eur. Neighbourhood 
Policy, Address at the Plenary Debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Eur. Parl. 
(Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-
191_en.htm?locale=en (recalling that implementation of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement between the EU and BiH is conditioned on BiH making a 
“credible effort” toward the reforms required by Sejdić and Finci). 
 185. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., BOSNIA’S GORDIAN KNOT: CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM (Europe Briefing No. 68), July 12, 2012, 15–16 (arguing that the EU will 
create long-term damage in BiH if it accepts “a mere papering-over of the cracks 
exposed by the European Court” in exchange for EU membership, instead of 
insisting on more comprehensive constitutional reform). 
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in Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina that this type of 
discrimination would no longer be tolerated for BiH.186  
Prior to Sejdić and Finci, the BiH Constitutional Court decided in 
Pilav that electoral discrimination under BiH law was still 
justified.187 However, this decision did not fully take into account the 
European Court’s previous jurisprudence on electoral discrimination 
based on ethnicity, and it did not consider that BiH no longer had a 
reasonable and objective basis for discrimination based on ethnicity. 
If the European Court were to take the Pilav case, it would issue a 
ruling similar to Sejdić and Finci.  
 
 
 186. See Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Apps. Nos. 27996/06 & 
34836/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 33 (holding that differential treatment based on 
ethnicity in Articles IV and V of the BiH Constitution qualifies as discrimination 
under Article 14, Article 3 of Protocol 1, and Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the 
European Convention because there is no longer a reasonable and objective 
justification for the treatment). 
 187. See Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu v. Pilav [Ustavni Sud BiH] 
[Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina] Sept. 29, 2006, No. AP-2678/06 
at 11 (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/ 
povuci_pdf.php?pid=67930 (holding that restrictions in Article V of the 
Constitution and Article 8.1 of the Election Law relating to election to the 
Presidency have an reasonable and objective justification because they are 
necessary for the preservation of peace in BiH). 
